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Sustaining Indigenous futures?  
Welfare reform and responsibility for the other1 
 
Cate Thill 
University of Notre Dame, Sydney 
 
 
 
Debates about the provision of welfare over the past decade have been founded upon an 
increasing concern with the responsibilities of welfare recipients. In Australia, as elsewhere, 
the emphasis has been on recipients’ responsibility to rise above their circumstances (no 
matter how constraining) in order to ‘give something back’ to society. This practice of 
‘responsibilisation’ has recently been extended to parents and residents of certain remote 
Northern Territory and Far North Queensland communities, in response to an inquiry into 
the protection of Aboriginal children from sexual abuse (Northern Territory Government 
2007). Parents and community members have an enforceable obligation to control and 
civilise their own conduct as well as that of their children (see Yeend & Dow 2007). 
 
The approach to welfare reform in Indigenous communities introduced by the former 
Howard Government is punitive and paternalistic. Aboriginal parents and community 
members are subject to a new income management regime in cases of child neglect or by 
reason of geographical location. Indeed, in seventy-three designated Northern Territory 
communities the reforms are obligatory and indiscriminately applied to all residents (Altman 
2007, p. 311).  Income management diverts all or part of a person’s hitherto inalienable 
benefit payments to a special account for the provision of priority needs. Worryingly, 
specific details about the circumstances that trigger subjection to income management—for 
those who do not inhabit prescribed NT communities—and the precise meaning of priority 
needs are not spelt out in legislation. The bill also eschews the principle of anti-
discrimination (Yeend & Dow 2007, pp. 7, 4). 
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Influential Indigenous leader Noel Pearson (2000) has long supported this kind of 
intervention as part of a broader solution to community dysfunction, child abuse and 
neglect.  Indeed, the legislation implements Cape York welfare reform trials that extend 
income management and other measures to specified Far North Queensland communities 
based on recommendations put forward by Pearson and the Cape York Institute (2007). 
Pearson’s support for welfare reform is, however, grounded in albeit a contested positive 
alternative vision of reciprocal responsibility, economic development and self-
determination. 
 
Broadly bipartisan support indicates that the latest welfare reform measures are likely to 
have a significant effect on the future of Indigenous citizenship. While the Howard 
Government has recently been replaced by a more progressive Labor government, the new 
government remains committed to the changes in their current form until a review 
scheduled for mid-2008.  The review, as well as the more collaborative approach of the 
current government, renders careful critical analysis and public scrutiny of Indigenous 
welfare reform an urgent and productive task. Drawing on the work of Emmanuel Levinas 
(1969), this paper questions the normative assumptions underpinning these changes.  
Negatively, I question two frameworks for thinking about responsibility that inform 
Indigenous welfare reform; namely, protection and mutual obligation. Positively, I argue for 
an alternative approach to welfare reform that both foregrounds a sense of responsibility 
for the other and sustains alterity. 
 
Welfare provision and responsibility 
 
Most immediately, the welfare reform measures targeting Indigenous people are based on 
the concept of protection. Aboriginal people, families and communities are represented as 
being in need of protection from themselves or, more specifically, from anti-social 
behaviours such as child and substance abuse. On this view, income management is a  
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technique of ‘responsibilisation’ designed to punish Indigenous people for their failure to 
take responsibility for ‘controlling and civilising’ both their conduct and their children 
(Clarke 2005, p. 451). The punishment, alongside subjection to paternalistic controls, is the 
quarantining of fifty percent of income support and family assistance payments as well as 
one hundred percent of lump sum and baby bonus payments (FaHCSIA 2008). 
 
Welfare reform in Australia is also grounded in the notion of ‘mutual obligation’.  Here 
ressentiment on the part of the hardworking, taxpaying community is manifest towards 
those reliant on public benefits.  On the one hand, ordinary members of the Australian 
community are characterised as righteous insofar as they assume responsibility for their 
own security by working hard, paying their taxes and purchasing private insurance.  
Indigenous populations, on the other hand, are represented in terms of welfare 
dependency, as both failing to live up to this norm of self-responsible community 
membership and being ‘a drain on public resources’ (Lawrence & Gibson 2007, p. 659).  In 
this context, the belief that the latter group ‘should do something “in return for” public 
income support assumes a self-evident quality’ (Yeatman 2004, p. 83). 
 
Both the discourse of protection and that of mutual obligation represent Indigenous people 
as ‘failed’ citizens and, at the same time, render citizenship dependent on the exercise of 
self-responsible, civilized conduct. In keeping with the broader discourse of mutual 
obligation and despite evidence that Indigenous populations are severely under-resourced 
(see Lawrence & Gibson 2007, p. 659), the emphasis is somewhat perversely on Aboriginal 
people’s responsibilities to the ‘community’ and not vice versa. The danger here is that this 
focus on the problem of self-responsibility occludes any sense of responsibility for others 
and thereby fosters indifference towards Indigenous people and communities. 
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Responsibility for the other 
 
Levinas offers a framework for thinking about responsibility wherein, above all else, the 
subject is responsible for the other. This responsibility emerges in the ethical or face-to-face 
relation, in which the encounter with the other calls the self to justify its existence.  
According to Levinas,  
 
the Other qua Other is situated in a dimension of height and of abasement 
– glorious abasement; he [sic] has the face of the poor, the stranger, the 
widow, and the orphan, and, at the same time, of the master called to 
invest and justify my freedom. (cited in Secomb 2007, pp. 60-61)  
 
The relation to the other is not one of mutual obligation, in which the other is reciprocally 
responsible to the self.  Rather, in the face of hunger and even death, the self is primarily 
hostage to the needs of the other (Levinas c1985, p. 98-100). 
 
Importantly, in Levinas’ conception of the ethical relation the singularity of the other and 
the self is upheld. Insofar as the other manifests itself as face it ruptures cultural meaning 
and presents a radical limitation to the experiences of the self. Put simply, the self cannot 
experience the materiality of the world in precisely the same way as another. This implies 
that responsibility to the other involves appreciating her or his alterity and accepting that 
this alterity exceeds the experiences of the self (Oksala 2005, p. 204). At the same time, to 
the extent that the other calls the self to responsibility, then the face-to-face relations also 
function as the condition of emergence for the unique capacity of the self to respond to the 
needs of the other. This suggests that the self can command resources on its own behalf 
and thereby both refuse the invocation inherent within the ethical relation and greet the 
other with hospitality (Levinas 1969, pp. 215-216; Levinas c1985, pp. 100-101). 
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A couple of objections regarding the applicability of Levinas’ framework to the issue of 
Indigenous welfare reform might be raised at this point. Firstly, it potentially figures white 
Australians as hosts and Aboriginal people as strangers in their own land. Indigenous 
people’s status as the original inhabitants of Australia does not, however, make Levinas’ 
ethical relation untenable. Rather, it reformulates this imperative as historically and 
culturally specific and foregrounds a particular sense of responsibility for the ways in which 
‘my place in being … *is+ already usurpation, already violence with respect to the other’ 
(Levinas 1999, p. 179).   
 
Secondly, Levinas’ account of ethical responsibility is not a framework that can be readily 
transformed into a political program. Nonetheless, a salient feature of his perspective 
concerns the imbrication of ethics and politics. Robert Bernasconi (2002) interprets the 
ethical direction Levinas presents—the sense of non-indifference towards responsibility for 
the other—as something that governs not only interpersonal but also political relations. For 
Levinas, ethical responsibility is first principle and, while he acknowledges that the 
requirements of justice have a necessary place, he maintains that ethical responsibility 
provides the impetus for justice and thereby remains indispensable in a different and more 
profound sense. 
 
The conception of rights that Levinas (c1999) provides usefully exemplifies this point. He 
argues that rights are founded upon a feeling of responsibility for the other. Conventional 
liberal accounts tend to reduce rights to the function of brokering a mutual compromise 
between the competing interests of an array of sovereign individuals within a political 
community. By contrast, Levinas contends that insofar as human sociality depends on 
people limiting their freedom for the sake of others, then the meaning of rights necessarily 
exceed the interests of the self. Here rights emerge out of a sense of good will towards the 
figure of the stranger, which represents the radical alterity of the other (Levinas c1999, p. 
149). 
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Linnell Secomb (2007) argues that social rights, in particular, reveal a trace of Levinas’ ideal 
of ethical responsibility in everyday life. That is, the income support and social services 
provided to vulnerable members of society are, at least in part, a way of responding to the 
needs of others. In practice, social welfare may be inadequate. It may be motivated by a less 
than altruistic concern to secure ourselves from future contingency and enforce some form 
of mutual obligation such as an effort by recipients to exercise self-responsibility. Despite 
this Secomb insists that—albeit to a limited extent—a trace of responsibility for the other is 
sustained (2007, p. 61). 
 
Following Levinas and Secomb, then, I suggest that social rights are governed by a sense of 
non-indifference towards our responsibility for the other and cannot be reduced to the 
principle of responsibility-for-self. It is, however, important to question the extent to which 
this non-indifference governs Indigenous welfare reform in the present. Most immediately, 
it would seem that these measures represent a straightforward abandonment of ethical 
responsibility for the other. Not only are benefits made conditional on the exercise of self-
responsible civility but recipients are also subjected to paternalistic control. On the other 
hand, it is possible to interpret recent initiatives targeting Aboriginal people as a re-
codification rather than an abandonment of discourses of social rights, so that arguably a 
faint trace of responsibility for the other remains evident. 
 
Indeed, Rebecca Lawrence and Chris Gibson (2007) make clear that the former Howard 
Government’s policy of welfare reform is a shrewd (if rather offensive) re-deployment of 
campaigns for Indigenous autonomy and citizenship rights. It can be interpreted then, at 
least in part, as a response to challenges by Indigenous activists during the 1990s directed at 
the overly bureaucratic welfare state, which served to stifle the provision of even basic 
services to Aboriginal people and communities (Lawrence & Gibson 2007, p. 661). More 
specifically, prominent Indigenous leader Noel Pearson’s demand for the ‘right to a real 
economy’ (2000, p. 154), as well as his criticisms of the apparent culture of ‘welfare  
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dependency’ within Indigenous communities, are articulated with and function to legitimise 
the Government’s mutual obligation approach as a response to community expectations. A 
statement made by the former Indigenous Affairs Minister, Mal Brough, illustrates this 
point: 
 
In late 2005, Noel Pearson and the [Cape York] Institute approached the 
Howard Government with a proposal to radically change the way welfare 
was administered to remote Indigenous communities in the Cape … The 
Institute told us that … welfare offered these communities little more than 
a pathway to lifelong dependency. Communities want changes that ensure 
parents are held to account for the education and care for their children 
and incentives created for young people to aspire to a future which gives 
then choices and opportunity … (cited in Johns 2007, pp. 325-6) 
 
Significantly, Lawrence and Gibson’s analysis of the discourse of mutual obligation and 
Pearson’s invocation of this framework make clear that there is no necessary opposition 
between the principles of self-responsibility and responsibility for the other. Tension 
between these principles transpires insofar as self-responsibility is treated as an end in 
itself. The problem here is that self-responsibility is regarded as first principle instead of a 
somewhat counterintuitive way of prioritising the demands of the other.  To the extent that 
means displace ends in this way, then Indigenous welfare reform fosters indifference 
towards those who fall through the cracks. 
 
Indigenous welfare reform as indifference 
 
It is important not to be unduly cynical about similarities between governmental discourses 
of mutual obligation and claims on the part of Aboriginal activists and others regarding the 
need for greater autonomy within Indigenous communities. To do so would be to occlude 
the agency of Indigenous activists as participants the policy process. Nonetheless, an effort  
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to listen to the voices and choices of admittedly select Aboriginal ‘spokespeople’ is clearly 
not the only thing going on here. The approach to Indigenous welfare reform initiated by 
the former Howard Government further undermines the pursuit of self-determination and is 
problematically articulated with the rationality of assimilation. 
 
While the Howard Government cherry-picked the elements of Aboriginal rights claims that 
converge with its approach to welfare reform, absent from this agenda was any assertion of 
Indigenous communities as bearers of native title rights (Lawrence & Gibson 2007, pp. 663-
666). On the contrary, Pat Turner and Nicole Watson (2007) argue that fears about child 
sexual abuse have been mobilised as a ‘Trojan horse’ to empower the federal government 
to seize control of Indigenous townships and do away with the permit system.2 Here the 
former Coalition government deployed the figure of the innocent child to justify its 
seemingly unrelated ambition to replace the kinship-based collective ownership that 
distinguishes Indigenous land title with market-based, individual home ownership (Gregg 
2007, p. 10; Turner & Watson 2007, p. 206).  
 
The figure of the innocent child also provides the justification for the retrenchment of the 
Community Development Employment Programs (CDEP) scheme and implementation of 
income management. Taken together, these initiatives are intended to incorporate 
Aboriginal people and populations into mainstream employment and training opportunities 
and to ensure that benefits earmarked for children’s welfare are spent accordingly (Hinkson 
2007, pp. 4-5). This represents the issue of welfare dependency as a problem of self-
responsibility rather than lack of resources. Indeed, ongoing government interventions 
embody techniques of assimilation, which enforce ‘civilized’ conduct through the rationing 
of income support payments and gradual integration into mainstream economic life 
(Lawrence & Gibson 2007, pp. 658, 666-7). 
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From a Levinasian perspective, however, the innocence of Aboriginal children in Australia is 
already undercut by the experience of ‘belonging to a society that is indifferent, as a society, 
to those who fall through the cracks’ (Bernasconi 2002, p. 9). That is, a society which seeks 
to assimilate Indigenous alterity, cultivate expressions of indifference towards traditional 
land and kinship attachments at both the institutional and cultural levels, and disregard 
scholarly evidence linking positive health outcomes with self-determination (Gregg 2007, p. 
10; Turner & Watson 2007, p. 206). More generally, the rationality of assimilation reduces 
justice to the discourses of protection and mutual obligation outlined earlier. This opens the 
possibility of pitting the needs of Indigenous populations against the claims of non-
indigenous citizens and requiring the former group to bargain for the provision of basic 
services that the latter group tends, for the most part, to take for granted (Lawrence & 
Gibson 2007, p. 661). 
 
I contend that Levinas offers an alternative framework for citizenship rights. His conception 
of responsibility for the other provides an ethical direction to the politics of Indigenous 
welfare provision, not in the sense that it offers a blueprint for reform but insofar as it 
challenges the prevailing view that mutual obligation is the first principle of sociality. It also 
positively foregrounds the issue of sustaining Aboriginal alterity as a crucial element of 
citizenship. This interpretation of social rights is not a nostalgic invocation of so-called 
‘passive welfare’. Indeed, my readings of Pearson (2000) and Lawrence and Gibson (2007) 
indicate that prioritising the needs of the other involves responding to complex needs such 
as working with Indigenous communities to foster capacities for autonomy and self-
responsibility in the context of a broader commitment to self-determination. The question is 
how this cultivation of capacities can be detached from its present reduction to the 
rationality of assimilation. 
 
Here the new Labor government has taken a number of encouraging initial steps towards 
enhancing both the political and cultural situation of Aboriginal people in Australia. These  
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include a formal apology to members of the Stolen Generations, a commitment to replacing 
the National Indigenous Council with a representative body and reinstating the permit 
system and CDEP (Macklin 2008; Skelton 2008, p. 29).3  The promise to reinstate the permit 
system is a way of responding to demands for self-determination and sustaining Aboriginal 
alterity to the extent that it acknowledges Indigenous Australians’ distinct relationship and 
right to ancestral lands.  Similarly, the government’s commitment to CDEP recognises the 
specificity of Indigenous existence. In particular, the need for a complex approach to 
development that cannot simply be reduced to market economics and Aboriginal people’s 
active cultural and environmental contributions through the arts and natural resource 
sustainability programs (Altman 2007). These measures are, however, likely to complicate 
the process of quarantining welfare benefits and it is as yet unclear how these potential 
barriers to implementation will be negotiated. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, I have suggested that Levinas provides a useful framework with which to call 
into question and re-direct struggles over Aboriginal citizenship. Substantively, it is 
demonstrated that the rationality of assimilation continues to destroy Aboriginal alterity 
and foster indifference to Indigenous people and populations.  The former Howard 
Government justified Indigenous welfare reform ‘for the sake of the children’ but tended to 
ignore the broader positive question of what kinds of futures Indigenous children are being 
protected for beyond assimilation into mainstream cultural and economic life. Levinas offers 
a possible direction for political thinking and activism wherein the issues of sustaining 
Aboriginal cultural alterity and listening to the voices of Indigenous Australians are 
foregrounded. 
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Notes 
                                                             
1. I would like to thank the ARC Cultural Research Network, the organisers of Sustaining 
Culture Conference at the University of South Australia and the Cultural Studies 
Association of Australasia for the ARC Cultural Research Network Award that provided the 
opportunity to present this paper. I am also grateful to participants whose critical 
responses inspired the reframing of some of the ideas in this paper and would especially 
like to thank Tanja Dreher, Ron Hoenig, Justine Lloyd and Stephen Muecke for feedback 
on the paper. 
2. Facilitated and administered by the Central Land Council, on behalf of traditional owners, 
the permit system is a ‘tool for allowing and negotiating third party access to Aboriginal 
lands and communities’ (Ross 2007, p. 239). 
3. The Stolen Generations refers to the children systematically removed from their families 
and communities and raised as wards of the state under the policy of assimilation. 
    The National Indigenous Council was established by the Howard government—after the 
abolition of the representative Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC)—
to provide advice on Indigenous Affairs. Its membership consisted of fourteen Aboriginal 
people hand-picked by the former government (Lawrence & Gibson 2007). 
 
 
